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Barton: Introduction

CALIFORNIA WESTERN
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 34

SPRING 1998

NUMBER 2

CONCEIVING THE LAWYER AS
CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVER: INTRODUCTION
THOMAS D. BARTON
In this symposium issue, "Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem
Solver," the California Western Law Review celebrates the central mission
of California Western School of Law to educate creative problem solvers.
Long part of the philosophy of the school, the concept has recently galvanized formation of the McGill Center for Creative Problem Solving. Generously funded by the Weingart Foundation, the McGill Center will undertake
empirical and qualitative efforts to understand and promote non-violent dispute resolution skills among youngsters, and will seek ways to make law
more effective in the prevention of domestic violence. Additionally, the
Center will produce and circulate written materials and videos designed to
raise awareness in the legal community and among the public generally
about the opportunities for solving problems better.
With this issue, the CaliforniaWestern Law Review begins what will be
an ongoing effort to publish a rich diversity of scholarly discussion of creative problem solving. The Review hopes-now and in years to come-to be
a primary source for those who seek to examine how law and the legal process may contribute to effective, respectful, inclusive ways to resolve personal and social problems. A portion of every volume will address this mission, and the Review invites all those who may be inspired by the goal to
submit their own contributions. As with the articles in this symposium,
authors may address particular problems, techniques of problem prevention
and resolution, theoretical aspects of assessing problems and their solutions,
or the teaching of problem solving theory and skills.
In the best tradition of scholarly investigation, no one political or theoProfessor of Law, California Western School of Law. B.A., 1971, Tulane University; J.D., 1974, Cornell Law School; Ph.D., 1982, Cambridge University.
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retical orientation will be privileged in the Review's offerings. Some published articles will be critical of legal assumptions or legal institutions; others will detail historical successes of the law. Yet others will suggest particular legal reforms, or will attempt to couple the language of law with that
of psychology, sociology, politics, or ethics.
The works of the current symposium are representative of this diversity.
They urge, for example, the use of a universalist legal language to challenge
the prevailing rhetoric of power in international relations (Kritsiotis),' and to

empower indigenous peoples everywhere (Smith).2 They reveal the core of

legal thinking to be the abstraction and articulation of consistent principles,

and advocate the greater use of precedent in environmental decision making
(Pardy).' They address substantive problems, and the need to reform legal
rules or practice concerning those problems (Brownlie regarding securities
class action suits in state courts;' Kanazawa regarding manufacturer exposure to product liability claims;5 Sorenson regarding sexual harassment actions"). They seek to enhance sensitivity to the emotional needs of clients
by calling on lawyers to join in identifying "psycholegal soft spots" in legal

representation (the paper of Patry, Wexler, Stolle, and Tomkins).7 They call
for lawyers to develop a variety of problem solving tools plus the imagination, personal courage, and human empathy to employ those particular tools
that best address a particular problem (the separate papers of Kerper, Coo-

per,9 and Barton°). They advance the pedagogy that will be essential to

educating lawyers in developing those skills (the separate works by Nathanson,"1 Morton," Johnson, 3 and Ireland'). Last but not least, they compile
1. See Dino Kritsiotis, The Power of InternationalLaw as Language, 34 CAL. W. L.
REV. 397 (1998).
2. See Rhona K.M. Smith, The InternationalImpact of CreativeProblem Solving: Resolving the Plight of Indigenous Peoples, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 411 (1998).
3. See Bruce Pardy, Abstraction, Precedent, andArticulate Consistency: Making Enviromnental Decisions,34 CAL. W. L. REV. 427 (1998).
4. See Robert W. Brownlie, Federal Preemption as a Possible Response to a New
Challenge: Securities Class Actions in State Court, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 493 (1998).
5. See Sidney K. Kanazawa and Dan R. Gallipeau, Minimizing ProductLiability Exposure: PracticalSolutionsfor Manufacturers,34 CAL. W. L. REv. 509 (1998).
6. See Richard C. Sorenson et al., Solving the Chronic Problem of Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace: An EmpiricalStudy of FactorsAffecting Employee Perceptionsand Consequences of Sexual Harassment,34 CAL. W. L. Rzv. 457 (1998).
7. See Marc W. Patry et al., Better Legal Counseling Through Empirical Research:
Identifying PsycholegalSoft Spots and Strategies, 34 CAL. W. L. Rzv. 439 (1998).
8. See Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case Method: A Marvelous
Adventure in Which Winnie-the-PoohMeets Mrs. Palsgraf,34 CAL. W. L. REv. 351 (1998).
9. See James M. Cooper, Towards a New Architecture: CreativeProblem Solving and
the Evolution of Law, 34 CAL. W. L. Rzv. 297 (1998).
10. See Thomas D. Barton, CreativeProblemSolving: Purpose, Meaning, and Values,
34 CAL. W. L. Ray. 273 (1998).
11. See Stephen Nathanson, Designing Problems to Teach Legal Problem Solving, 34
CAL. W. L. Rsv. 325 (1998).
12. See Linda Morton, Teaching CreativeProblemSolving: A ParadigmaticApproach,
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published sources through which new ideas may be explored and developed
(the annotated bibliography of Phyllis Marion). 5
The scholarly and educational ambition of California Western is the
construction of, in Cooper's words, an "architecture" of problem solving. 6
But why, it may be asked, should a law school embark on such an enter-

prise? The question has two distinct dimensions: first, why is creative
problem solving important? And second, why a law school? Why not leave
problem solving to cognitive scientists, logicians, or economists?
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING

Creative problem solving is important for at least three reasons, one of
which is obvious and the other two more subtle. The obvious reason is that

creative problem solving is dedicated to generating new mentalities and
skills to be applied to problems. In turn, problems are likely to be solved

better-more reliably, more durably, more respectfully and with fewer sideeffects-where a diversity of alternative procedures is available to approach
the problem. Each new procedure offers a slightly different perspective on a
problem from which some nuance or facet of the problem may be uniquely
visible. The more dimensions of a problem have been considered in advance of applying a solution, the more comprehensive and better the solution is likely to be.
The second reason that problem solving is important is that techniques
of problem solving must be humanly invented. Problem solving does not
exist in nature, or at least not at the cognitively complex levels that humans
understand the concept.'7 We have inherited from previous generationsthrough their genius and sometimes considerable personal sacrifices-the
devices that we now take for granted in solving problems: democracy, the
rule of law, scientific rationality, even the seemingly simple notion of enforcing promises. 8 Untold numbers of persons literally gave their lives to
secure these advances in non-violent problem solving. Simply put, we owe
it to future generations to continue this evolution-we owe it not only because the world may thereby be more peaceful, secure or just; and not only
because to do otherwise is to subordinate imagination to complacency and
34 CAL. W. L. REV. 375 (1998).
13. See Andrea L. Johnson, Teaching Creative Problem Solving and Applied Reasoning Skills: A ModularApproach, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 389 (1998).
14. See Marilyn J. Ireland, Magician to Sorcerer: A Book Review of Stephen Nathanson's "What Lawyers Do," 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 529 (1998).
15. See Phyllis C. Marion, ProblemSolving: An Annotated Bibliography, 34 CAL. W.

L. REv. 537 (1998).
16. See Cooper, supra note 9.
17. See Lon L. Fuller, Irrigationand Tyranny, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1021 (1965).
18. See Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, in FRIEDRICH

NmTzscHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 190 (Francis Golffing
trans., 1956).
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institutional inertia.
We owe the future our efforts at creative problem solving for the fundamental reason that the means by which we seek to understand and address
our problems goes far toward constituting who we are, and what in the future we will perceive as our problems.19 Means and ends are not discontinuous.2" What would we be, had we never adopted democracy-how limited
our horizons? What level of social trust could exist without enforceable
promises?" Absent the rule of law who could dare to be different?
II. LAW AS A BASIS FOR EXPLORING PROBLEM SOLVING

The second question asks why a law school should emerge as the training ground for creative problem solving. For several reasons, law is an attractive foundational discipline on which to design the architecture of problem solving. First, law is self-conscious of the values advanced by its
procedures. Second, its practitioners develop sensitivity and respect for
process regularity and legitimacy. Finally, by reason of its position as default problem solver, law has grappled with the most difficult issues faced
by individuals and society as a whole.
The central premise of law has always been that, quite apart from particular outcomes, how problems are solved matters greatly. As Pardy suggests, legal process does indeed work by hoisting an abstract principle and
shepherding related disputes under its canopy. 22 Doing so offers order and
protection through a process that, at least rhetorically, advances the rationality and equality of an enlightened society. Law certainly is propelled by instrumentalist goals, but it has always been willing to balance the quest for
accuracy and efficiency by a concern for human dignity and a belief in the
possibility of human redemption. Other disciplines like operations research,
economics, and engineering employ procedures that trade off some measure
of accuracy for higher efficiency. But as the law of evidentiary privilegese
and various aspects of criminal investigation and prosecution demonstrate,
only law will sacrifice both efficiency and accuracy to preserve the ties of
human loyalty ' or to shield individual autonomy from the reaches of the
state.
Second, the legal concern for procedure has instilled instincts among
lawyers for regularity and legitimacy. Such instincts may provide an in19. See Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The
Linits of InstrumentalRationality,46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617 (1973).
20. See id. at 650-51.
21. See Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirrorof Betrayal,75 B.U. L. REv. 531 (1995).
22. See Pardy, supra note 3.
23. See Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship,
1984 DuKE L.J. 631 (1984).
24. See GEORGEP. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: ANEsSAY ONTHE MORALrry OF RELATIONSHIPS
77-82 (1993).
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valuable ethical tether on the techniques that may be proposed under the icense of "creativity." In my view, techniques which are manipulative, deceptive, cruel, or malicious have no place in an expanded repertoire of legal
skills. Winning through intimidation or the promotion of fear does not
"solve" problems; it merely represses their symptoms and awaits their reemergence as covert retaliation.
Third, the law is experienced with the most contentious, most sensitive,
most important, and perhaps even the most complex problems. Over the
years the problems of scarcity, intolerance, and human cruelty have been
addressed in the law-although certainly not completely successfully.
Growing social problems of distribution, identity, and relational fragmentation will require the breadth of vision-some would say arrogance-that the
law presumes. The traditional legal tools of rules and rights may well be inadequate to meet the demands of those problems, but the common law spirit
of necessitated improvisation may fuel the creativity needed to fashion new
legal tools or forge partnerships with other disciplines.
Toward, then, the end of civil, respectful relationships, we invite your
participation in the means of achieving it: studying, criticizing, and building
creative ways of solving problems.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997

5

California Western Law Review, Vol. 34 [1997], No. 2, Art. 2

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol34/iss2/2

6

